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RESPONSE
SOME REFLECTIONS ON CUSTOM IN THE IP UNIVERSE
Richard A. Epstein*

P

ROFESSOR Jennifer Rothman has written a long and thoughtful
article whose central thesis is that we should be cautious about using
customary practices to decide intellectual property cases, especially in
the copyright area.1 At the theoretical level, her skepticism about custom
is at odds with the defense of custom that I have offered in previous
writings, and still defend in a wide range of tort and contractual
contexts.2 I am grateful that the editors of the Virginia Law Review have
invited this brief response, which accepts some of Professor Rothman’s
main points but dissents on others. It is convenient to divide this
commentary into dubious and useful customs.
DUBIOUS CUSTOMS
Rothman’s basic critique is that the overextension of custom in
copyright cases has unduly narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine.
*

James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Peter
and Kirsten Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution.
1
This essay is a response to Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in
Intellectual Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899 (2007).
2
See Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85, 85 (1992) (dealing with the
misappropriation); see also Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling
Informal Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (1999);
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1992).
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As she notes, judges and lawyers have struggled gallantly to make sense
of the maddeningly vague statutory definition of the defense.3 In my
view, she stands on very strong ground in insisting that a narrow reading
of the fair use defense should not be established through the aggressive
behavior of individual copyright holders who frighten off potential users
of their copyrighted material. The mechanism that she outlines is as
deadly as it is effective. The copyright holder—she refers to Steven
Joyce—adopts an aggressive litigation strategy that leads potential users
either to back off their original project or to pay the demanded license
fee.4 The former cases are lost to history, but the latter are then
(mis)interpreted by courts as evidence of the narrow scope of the fair use
privilege. She is right to reject any alleged custom that is formed in the
shadow of improper legal threats, as courts are better advised to make
some independent judgment as to whether the copying falls within the
scope of the fair use defense—assuming someone is brave enough to
risk the very heavy statutory damages available in copyright cases.
Rothman presents no systematic evidence about the frequency of these
practices, but her cautionary remarks to judges strike me as fully
justified.
Her point must be placed in context, however, for it is critical to
remember that defenders of custom such as myself fully embrace this
conclusion. Any custom worthy of the name has to result from repeated
voluntary interactions among parties from the relevant groups;
otherwise, it offers no evidence that a purported custom maximizes the
joint welfare of the parties whom it governs. Without doubt, no custom
should bind strangers to its formation who lose systematically from its
application. Yet that is exactly what happens when the threat of
litigation shapes the behavior of the submissive parties. We do not have
to worry about what kinds of cooperative interactions generate customs.
3

See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 provides that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
4
See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1912 nn.32–33.
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It is quite enough to rule out the purported legitimacy of any threatinduced custom.
USEFUL CUSTOMS
The differences between myself and Rothman arise because she
extends this critique to customs that I think work well in their broader
institutional context. In this brief comment I shall address three such
cases. The first deals with the brief use of copyrighted material in set
dressings. The second concerns the major settlement between the
publishers and universities over the scope of the fair use privilege, and
the last concerns the ability of individual scientists and researchers to
make personal copies of copyrighted materials.
Set Dressings
A central theme in Rothman’s work is to decry the use of a “clearance
culture” that has arisen in the movie industry.5 I understand Rothman’s
frustration, for example, with Judge Newman’s failure in the Second
Circuit to accept as a matter of law the fair use defense in Ringgold v.
Black Entertainment Television.6 That case involved a defendant who
used a plaintiff’s poster “Church Picnic Story Quilt” as a background
prop for a combined period of less than 30 seconds , albeit it in the
center of the screen, but to which no dialogue or plot line was directed.
This work was a distinctive form of art pioneered by Faith Ringgold,
which involved the combined use of “a painting, a handwritten text, and
a quilting fabric,” and conveyed messages about African-American life
in the early part of the 20th century.7 The defendant’s show was a sitcom
called “ROC” about the experiences of a middle-class black family
living in Baltimore.
Looking at the overall context, however, it is far from clear that any
industry custom in favor of licensing is necessarily misguided. Nor does
Judge Newman seem incorrect when he found that the defendant’s
limited use should not be treated a fair use as a matter of law, which was
the only point he decided. Initially, there is no evidence of the kind of
bullying behavior that Rothman found in other cases. If, moreover, the
fair use defense is denied, what is the big deal? By assumption, there is
5

See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1911–16.
126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
7
Id. at 72.
6

382-RAE-IP-UNIVERSE

210

1/22/2008 12:12:04 PM

Virginia Law Review In Brief

[Vol. 93:207

no real connection between the displayed poster and any thematic
element of the sitcom episode. If we read the facts that way, there is no
particular reason to use it at all, for any other poster should do as well.
Accordingly, if the custom is respected, one of three things ought to
happen. First, the license fee in this case will be trivial because of the
credible threats to use other decorative art in the background. Second,
ironically, an astute film maker may well ask for product placement
fees, which the owners of some copyrighted works might well be
prepared to pay. Or third, the defendant (by assumption) loses little by
putting up some other art work that lies in the public domain. In fact, in
this case, Ringgold had turned down offers for use of the type that the
defendant made. All in all, I see little to criticize in Judge Newman’s
nuanced account of the fair use doctrine. In particular I think that he is
clearly right on the fourth fair use factor when he writes:
Ringgold is not required to show a decline in the number of licensing
requests for the “Church Picnic” poster since the ROC episode was aired.
The fourth factor will favor her if she can show a “traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed” market for licensing her work as set decoration.8

In addition, Rothman has missed some of the advantages of following
a customary practice to license. The first is that the industry norm avoids
drawing the hard lines that arise when any of these variables change.
When the poster is displayed for a longer period of time, or when it
becomes a focal point for dialog or the thematic development of the
movie, does the result change? This custom therefore has a beneficial
sorting effect that Rothman does not discuss. The cases where the art has
no distinctive role are cases where the set designer can choose artwork
in the public domain. The advantage of denying the fair use defense is
that it stimulates artistic production by opening up a second revenue
stream. If in fact there is widespread agreement on both sides of the
industry, then the custom may well advance global efficiency by
clarifying property rights and avoiding the endless litigation under the
unavoidably vague statutory fair use standard. After all, it is not clear
that the defendant should prevail under a straight statutory reading. The
use made of the poster is, but only after a fashion, commercial; the
creative nature of the copyrighted work—art—cuts in the plaintiff’s
favor; the use of the work is entire, albeit for a short period of time; and
the use of the work might stimulate the demand for posters, or
8

Id. at 81
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alternatively, undercut that for set-dressings. This is a close case under
the statute. Yet no matter which way it comes out, Rothman puts far too
great a weight on the individual case relative to the need for stable
institutional arrangements to deal with mass transactions. Before
challenging this custom, I would like to see some systematic industry
dissatisfaction with the arrangement, either by newcomers or established
firms. On balance, this industry practice, if established, looks quite
defensible.
Class Packets
I think that there is even stronger reason to defend the various
commercial arrangements that have been developed over time for the
reproduction of class packets and scholarly articles, both of which
Rothman criticizes.9 These packets do not raise issues of artistic
creativity such as those found in Ringgold. Rather, they are straight
commercial disputes, involving the mass copying of large chunks of
protected works, so that a heavy burden lies on the copier to show fair
use even in the absence of custom. For example, the Classroom
Guidelines set pretty strict limits for fair use that cover 250 words or less
of poetry and other prose excerpts that range from 500 to 2,500 words.10
Rothman notes that these industry minimums have quickly become
standardized norms “in stark contrast to the open-ended nature of the
fair use criteria set forth in Section 107.”11
This transformation is all to the good. Rothman notes that these
guidelines have had widespread compliance with most universities, but
never pauses to explain why that result does not make sense. Vague fair
use tests do not always give an infringer a fighting chance to win. The
usual course packet contains excerpts from writings of different length
and type, and no prudent administrator wants to ask anyone to make a
case by case determination with respect to each and every one of them.
The fixed guideline provides an intelligible safe harbor and the
particular word count for which permission is necessary. The clean line
reduces uncertainty and saves administrative costs. Individual

9

See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1926, 1935, 1940–41, 1953–56.
See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976),
as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83.
11
Rothman, supra note 1, at 1920.
10
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universities and libraries that are not signatories to the agreement have
sufficient resources to litigate against the norms. That they do not
suggests that this master settlement provides useful guidelines to all
those other schools that did not participate in their negotiation. Nor is
there a real risk of exploitation. There is every reason to believe that the
participants to these negotiations had a large enough stake to be careful
about the deal that they negotiated. Third parties are not excluded
strangers who are hurt by negotiations that pay no weight to their
concerns. Rather, they can confidently free ride on the standards that
skilled universities use for their own affairs, without making any
payment at all. This is hardly a case in which the nonparticipation of
these parties flunks Rothman’s representativeness test.12 And it is worth
noting that the license agreement supplies revenues to encourage the
production of new works, which of course the fair use defense
forecloses.
Research Copies
I take the same view toward American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
where the noncompliance with industry custom figured in the Second
Circuit’s rejection of the industry custom.13 Once again Rothman
deplores a result that is eminently defensible when fully analyzed. At
stake in the case was whether each of Texaco’s many research scientists
could make a single copy of articles from a journal for their own
personal use. I have no doubt that any individual subscriber is protected
by the fair use doctrine when he makes a copy for personal use. But the
cumulative impact changes when the same journal is circulated seriatim
to 500 or more readers. In principle, the journal seller might increase the
price of the subscriptions to research institutions and libraries to offset
their more intensive use, as is commonly done with the higher
subscription prices to libraries. But this approach would quickly lead to
evasive tactics (i.e. institutional subscriptions that masquerade as
individual ones). Or the journal seller could altogether cut out sales to
institutional subscribers whose low internal use levels do not justify
paying the higher price. The sensible way to handle this difficulty is to
develop a reliable source of reprints that allows the publisher to pick up
on the differential demands, just as a phone company monitors use by
12
13

See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1972–73.
60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994), discussed in Rothman, supra note 1, at 1935.
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charging in accordance with intensity of use. The publishers sensed this
opportunity and created a Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”) (which
Rothman did not discuss) which facilitated the massive reprint purchases
at low rates. The upshot is a stronger incentive for the publication of
journals in the first place. This institutional response removed any
transaction cost barriers to voluntary sales, and allowed for the precise
metering that cannot take place if the fair use defense is accepted. The
metering also permits the collection of revenue to spur production that
the fair use defense denies. To be sure, it was not crystal clear that the
fair use defense should have been allowed before the CCC was
developed. But a good case could be made in that direction because any
such potential market would surely have been forestalled if the fair use
defense was recognized before the formation of the CCC. The systemic
risk here, contrary to Rothman’s contention, is that once the fair use
exception gets embedded in common practice, it will act as a deterrent to
some future property rights solution. There are good and sufficient
reasons then to think that customary practice points us in the right
direction.
CONCLUSION
In sum, there is good reason to think that Rothman’s more ambitious
attacks on industry custom should be rejected. In this context, custom is
really a proxy for the creation of voluntary markets in a low transaction
costs environment. If these were inefficient, then the fair use defense,
which calls for no compensation, might be justified. But the fair use
defense means that the supplier of the copyrighted good gets no
revenues from the use of its copyrighted material, which neglects the
incentive function of copyright law. Rather than denigrate custom, the
wiser strategy is to develop clear rules that aid in the emergence and
enforcement of voluntary markets.
Preferred citation: Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on Custom
in the IP Universe, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 207 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/12/21/epstein.pdf.
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